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Abstract: We explore the relationship between commerciali sation and gender for groundnuts in 
Eastern Province, Zambia, using a mixed methods approach. Women saw themselves as having 
greater control over groundnuts than other crops, and both sexes saw groundnuts as controlled by 
women. Propensity Score Matching showed that machine shell ing and higher sales did not reduce 
women's perceived level of control over groundnuts. On the other hand, women welcomed greater 
male participation in machine shelling because it reduced the drudgery of shel ling by hand, and were 
willing to trade some control in exchange for the male labour required to capture the full benefits 
from commerciali sation. This suggests the need to re-think the narrative of commercalisation and 
gender as a zero sum game in favour of a cooperative-conflict model where bargaining between 
women and men can result in higher incomes for them both. 
Keywords: Gender; Commercialisation; mixed methods; Zambia 
1 INTRODUCTION 
It is widely believed that the commercialisation of food crops disempowers women. 
Traditional gender roles view women as the providers of food and men as the providers 
of wage goods. When food crops become commercialised, these gender roles conflict. 
Typically, men then assert their role as providers as wage goods to gain control of the 
income from food crops, relegating women to suppliers of labour. The paradigmatic case 
is irrigated rice in The Gambia, where commercialisation subverted women's rights to 
land, increased men's control over their labour power and turned femaJe farmers into hired 
*Correspondence to: Alaslair Orr, ICRISAT- Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya. 
E-mail: a.orr@cgiar.orgc 
1 Aside from the references to Camey and Watts (1990, 1991 ) cited in the preceding lexts. also refer to the slUdies 
by Dey ( 1981 , 1982) and von Braun and Webb ( 1989). not 10 mention Camey (1988, 1992. 1998). 
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workers (Camey & Watts, 1990, 1991). The adverse impact of commercialisation on 
women in The Gambia became a minor cottage industry. ] Subsequently, researchers seem 
to have lost interest in this topic, although work on global value chains supports these 
earlier conclusions (Dolan, 2001 ). In short, everything we know about commercialisation 
points to the dispiriting conclusion that it is bad news for women. 
The effect of commercialisation on women is therefore framed as a zero sum game. 
Commercialisation is evaluated by investigating changes in women's autonomy or their 
degree of control. Because these categories are finite, one person 's loss of autonomy or 
control is another's gain. There can only be winners and losers. This framing is reflected 
in language. Commercialisation is portrayed in war-like metaphors as a gender 'conflict ' 
where men and women contest ' terrain ' , establish 'beach-heads' and turn households into 
'battlegrounds' (Camey & Watts, 1991 ). Although a quarter of a century old, this 
narrative, with its powerful mix of Marxism and femini sm, exerts a magnetic pull that is 
hard to resist. Tt remains the primary frame of reference for thinking about the relationship 
between gender and commercialisation. 
In this paper, we challenge this framing of commercialisation and gender. Based on 
fieldwork with women groundnut farmers in Zambia, we argue that while some of their 
attitudes match this narrative, others do not. While defending their power to name 
groundnuts as a women's crop, the women were also willing to cooperate with men. In 
particular, the women were prepared to trade some degree of autonomy in exchange for 
greater maJe participation in shelling groundnuts. We expected the women to see male 
invol vement in mechanised shelling as a threat. Instead, they saw it as freeing them from 
drudgery. Moreover, by relieving this labour bottleneck, the women saw male participation 
in shelling as an opportunity to increase income for the whole household. This suggests 
that the women did not see the commercialisation of groundnuts as a zero sum game but 
were willing to bargain and negotiate, welcoming greater male participation while striving 
to retain operational and financial control. 
Our analysis proceeds on two axes. The first axis is the concept of 'women 's crops'. 
Historically, Africa was ' the region of female fanning par excellence' (Boserup, 1989), 
where crops were women's crops by definition ? Today, women's crops are more difficult 
to define. One helpful distinction is between separate crops, fields and tasks (Cloud, 1985). 
The concept of separate crops is problematic because despite claims to the contrary, 
women no longer supply most of the labour for crop production in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
at least for staple food crops (World Bank, 2015; Enete, Nweke, & Tollens, 2002). 
Likewi se, in Ghana, no crops are grown exclusively by women, whether by households 
headed by women, or on fields held by women or on fields from which women kept the 
income, although some crops are more commonly grown by women (Doss, 2002). 
Commercialisation blurs this pattern, with women in market-oriented households g:rowing 
crops that are otherwise grown mostly by men (Carr, 2008). However, women do often 
have their own fields, and women are still mainly responsible for certain crop management 
tasks, like weeding. Furthermore, there is a traditional 'gender division of control', 
whereby the income from particular crops is controlled by men or women (Geisler, 1993). 
The second axis of analysis is language. Crops are named as 'women's' or 'men' s crops' 
according to cultural beliefs about gender roles. For example, hybrid maize in Zambia was 
named a ' man's crop' because its poor taste and storage qualities made it more suitable for 
2Although researchers have challenged Boserup's thesis on several fronts. 'they have not dislodged the 
fundamental premise that female labour is central to African agriculture'. (Bryceson, 1995, p. 7). 
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Figure I. Conceptual framework for 'women's crops' 
sale than home consumption (Geisler, 1993). Similarly, improved cowpea in nOlt hern 
Ghana became a ' m::m 's crop' because it needed chemical sprays and knowledge of 
'medicine' belonged to men (Padmanabhan, 2007). Hence, the commercialisation of 
'women's crops' leads to disputes over mea ning. The meaning of a word depends on 
how it is used in language. In turn, how language is used depends on who has the power 
to give words a specific meaning. As Chomsky ( 1979) argues, 'questions of language- are 
basical1y questions of power' . This view of language- clearly influenced thinking on 
commercialisation in The Gambia.3 In the memorable words of earney and Watts 
(1990). ultimate- control over the income- from a specific crop belongs to those- who have 
'the power to name' . The power to define a crop according to its gender attributes also 
gives the power to control the product. When they cease to be known as 'women' s crops' 
that automaticall y belong to women, control becomes a matter for negotiation. llle 'power 
to name' is therefore a lionus test for the impact of commercialisation on women. 
The paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 outlines a conceptual framework, and 
Section 3 describes our data and methods. Section 4 explores verbal confl icts over 'the 
power to name' groundnuts as 3 women's crop, whJle the next section examine women 's 
perceptions on the impact of mechanisation. The final section concludes. 
2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure I provides a framework Unking the main concepts used in the paper. Reading from 
top to boltom, we hypothesise that the commercialisation of ' women ' s crops' disempowers 
women because they can no longer enforce their claims to access and control. 
We next distinguish between 'access' and ·control' . ' Access' has been defined as ' the 
abili ty to derive benefits from things' (Ribot & Peltlso, 2003), which equates access with 
effective control. However, 'access implies the righ t to use or benelit fro m a productive 
resource; control refers to the effective exercise of such rights' (Berry, 1989). In 
3The lille ofCamey and Walls's ( 1990) anicle. M(I/II~ractl/rillg Disselll. was a play on Hennan and Chornsky's 
ManuJor'wring COIISellt ( 1988). which examined Ihe influence of the media on public opinion. 
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Figure I, we define access as the ability to use a given resource, without implying control 
over benefits or their use. 
'Decision-making' is the term generally used by social scientists to operationalise 
'control ' . The standard practice is to identify key decision points, identify what role 
women play in making these decisions, which may then be combined into a single index 
(Alkire et aI., 2013). We distinguish between three different types of control. As Doss 
(2001) points out, 'women 's crops' should be defined not only by who controls the output 
but a lso by 'who chooses the crops to grow and who makes the management decisions' . 
We define 'strategic' control as the power to choose 'how' resources are allocated be tween 
competing crops, and 'operational' control as the power to choose 'what ' and 'when ' crop 
management operations are implemented. Thi s is similar to Kabeer' s (1999) distinction 
between 'policy-making ' and 'management' control. Finally, we defin e 'financial' control 
as the power to choose 'who' receives the realised value or income from the crop. Figure I 
uses 'decision-making' to cover decisions about a]1 three types of control-strategic, 
operational and financial. 
'Rights and claims' are the mechanisms by which agents negotiate 'access' and 'control'. 
Ribot and Peluso (2003) define a right as 'an enforceable claim'. A 'right' is therefore a 
claim whose validity is recognised either by law, custom or popular opinion. In Africa, 
women's rights are complex because rights are divisible. Women may have rights over 
different uses of the same plant (Howard & Nabanoga, 2007) or, as in the 'house property 
complex' in eastern Africa, rights to different categories of cattle (Oboler, 1996), or hold 
rights on behalf of others, such as rights in cattle for their sons (von Bulow, 1992). 
'Rights' and 'claims' to control are mobilised in two ways. First, they are 
operationalised in the 'conjugal contract' that 'sets the terms by which husbands and wives 
exchange goods, income and services, including labour' (Whitehead, 1981 ). Like rights, 
the terms of conjugal contract are not fixed but are renegotiated in response to changing 
circumstances. Second, they are mobili sed by the identification of specific "gender 
attributes', which are culturally defined ways of classifying resources in terms of whether 
they share male or female traits. 'Women's crops', for instance, are defined by feminine 
attributes such as their importance for 'relish' or a balanced meal, and the respon sibility 
of women to provide this part of the household diet then becomes part of the conjugal 
contract (Padmanabhan , 2007). 
3 DATA AND METHODS' 
Research was conducted in Eastern Province, Zambia, where groundnuts have historically 
been regarded as a 'women's crop'. Six in 10 farm households in this province grow 
groundnuts, which is second only to maize in terms of area planted, and one-fifth of the 
harvested crop is sold. Most groundnuts are sold to pri vate traders. Processing is limited, 
and most are consumed as nuts (Mofya-Mukuka & Shipekesa, 2013). Efforts are underway 
to commercialise groundnuts to supplement cotton, the traditional cash crop. The Eastern 
Province Fanners ' Cooperative (EPFC), established in 2007, is a farmers' organisation that 
buys and sells groundnut seed. Shelling groundnuts is generally performed manually by 
women, but in 2012, EPFC distributed machine shellers to selected seed producer groups. 
4For a full descri ption of our methods, the tool and its applications, refer to Orr, Tsusaka, Homann Kee-Tui, and 
Msere (20 14). 
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The first shellers were distributed to the oldest and largest EPFC groups. Although the 
shellers are hand-operated and suitable for women, they ilre primarily operated by men. 
Scenting cash, men have begun to take an interest in groundnuts and to claim a greater role 
in decision-maki ng for the crop, including a greater share of lhe income from sales. 
3.1 Measuring 'Control' 
To measure control, we developed a simple tool which we applied using a mixed method 
approach that combined qualitative and quantitalive instrument\). Testing hypotheses about 
social processes requires quantitative data (Gladwin et al., 2002). However, quantitative data 
on household decision-making are ;simple windows on complex realities· (Kabeer. 1999) 
that show the direction of control rmher than exact measurements. As one female panicipant 
commented, decisions about control are 'bedIoom decisions'-a private maller between 
husbands and wives. Qualitative data made those 'bedroom' decisions more visible. 
Figure 2 shows the tool we developed to measure 'women's control'. The crops (C 1--C4) in 
each quadrant are the crops for which women's conaul is compared. The decisions (D 1-D6) 
are the key decision s for crop production and sale for which the degree of women's control is 
measured. The scores (S 1-56) measure the degree of control tbat women have over these key 
decisions. Finally, the weights (W l-W6) are the relative importance that women give to these 
key decisions (D1 - D6). The weighted scores are aggregated to produce a weighted gender 
control index (Wocr). 
. . L~_ llVj~ .'lj~ 
A sex-dlsaggregated WOCl was defined for each crop as fo llows:WGClg = "2!:'-"k'--''-''-
L j = l lVj, 
where the subscript j .i s a decision, k is the number of decisions and g refers to either male 
(husband) or female (mai n wife, which we defined as the o ldest or first-married wife in a 
polygamous household). 
D,w, ____________________ ~ 
___ --------------- D, w~ 
s. 




Figure 2. The 'Women's Crop Tool ' 
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Table I. Socio-economic profile of group members 
Variable Tercil e I Tercil e 2 Terci le 3 Mean (p-value) 
(/l = 96) (/l = 96) (/l = 95) (/l = 285) 
Prod uction of groundnuts (kg, unshelled) 136.3 423.0 1810.3 782 .0 0.000 
Groundnuts sold (kg) 87.4 270.5 1093.8 479.1 0.000 
Family size (no.) 5.03 5.69 6.67 5.7 0.000 
Age of husband (years) 36.2 39.3 40.8 38.4 0.075 
Age of main wife (years) 30.3 33.6 34.7 32.5 0.052 
Education of husband (years) 6. 15 7.07 6.92 6.6 0. 127 
Education of main wife (years) 5.07 5.42 5.82 5.4 0.200 
Total area cultivated (ha) 2.6 1 3.1 5 3.24 3.0 0.056 
Area planted 10 groundnuts (ha) 0.37 0.65 0.89 0.6 0.000 
Source : Household Survey, 20 14. 
The tool was applied using focus group di scussions (FGDs) where information was 
recorded on a wall chart, and a household survey, where the same information was 
collected using a structured questionnaire. In both cases, we asked how much 'control ' 
women had over decision-making for groundnuts, cotton, mai ze and sunflower, and the 
relative importance of each decision. A full description of the questions and the 
questionnaire is given in Orr et al. (2014). 
3.2 Qualitative Data and Methods 
For qualitative data. we held FGDs with three types of EPFC seed producer groups, 
namely (i) groups with more than three years of experience of selling to EPFC, which 
we call 'commercial ' groups; (ii) groups that had at least two years of experience with 
the machine shell er. which we call 'commercial sheller' groups; and (iii) groups that had 
recently joined EPFC, which we call 'non-commercial' groups. We purposively selected 
two villages that had EPFC seed producer groups in one ofthese categories, giving a total 
of six villages.s We asked each group to select men and women to participate in FGDs. A 
total of 123 men and women participated in 12 FGDs (s ix with women and six with men). 
giving an average group size of 10 (Orr el al., 2014). All those who participated were 
members of EPFC seed-producer groups. 
Table I shows a socio-economic profile of group members from the household survey 
(refer to succeeding texts), stratified according to their production of groundnuts. A survey 
for Eastern Province in 2010-2011 gives an average area of 0.47 planted to groundnuts 
and groundnut sales of 151 kg per household (IAPR1, 2014). Despite significant 
heterogeneity. the mean values for EPFC group members were 0.6 ha planted and 479 kg 
sold. This suggests that they were more commercialised than other groundnut growers. 
The groups suggested four Chichewa words for control, including kulamulira ('being in 
charge '), kulollgola ('lead or go before '), kudollgosola ('arrange or speak in order') and 
ndondomekho ('following an agreed plan or procedure,).6 We ensured a common 
5The villages were Kagunda and Mafuta (commercial + sheller), Bwanunkha and Kapcnya (commercial) and 
Kazingizi and Stephen (noncommercial). All were located in Chipata dislrict except for Bwanunkha, which 
was located in Chadisa district 
6For the Engli sh definilions of kulamulira and kulol/gola. refer to Guerin (1985), sv; for kudol/gosola, refer to 
Scon (1965). sv: and for ndol/domekho, refer lO Paas (2013), sv. 
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understanding by using kulal1lulira as a reference point in all the FODs. Each FOD scored 
how much control women had over each decision, using a percentage scale of 0-100. The 
FODs also scored the importance of each decision for overall control on a 0-5 scale. We held 
separate FODs with men and women. After each group had finished, they came together in a 
plenary session to share their results, and the discussion was recorded and translated. 
3,3 Quantitative Data and Methods 
A household survey was conducted with smallholder farmers in three purposively selected 
villages at least 15 km apart within the same agro-ecological zone. Kagunda (where we 
conducted FODs) was the ' treatment' village that contained an EPFC seed producer group 
where a machine sheller had operated successfully for two crop seasons. The two 'control ' 
villages without a machine sheller were Kapenya (where we conducted FODs), and 
Mkhazika village in Katete district (where we did not conduct FODs). Only households 
with both male and female adults were selected for interview. To elicit the gender division 
of control , we interviewed the husband and his main wife separately. The husbands and 
wives were interviewed by male and female enumerators respectively. Within each village, 
100 households (i.e. 200 indi viduals) were randomly selected, giving a total of 100 
households from the village with the machine shell er and 200 households from the two 
villages without a machine shell er. 
To test hypotheses about women's control, we used univariate and bivariate analysis. 
Because both WOel and the gender share of workload are indicators of perceived levels 
and the sum of men's and women's figures is generally not equal to 100, average indicators 
of control and workload can be defined by taking the average of men 's and women's 
perceptions. That is, the average weighted gender control index CA WOCI) for women 
and men can be defined as: 
1 
AWGC/r = 2 { WGE/ r + (100 - WGc/ m)} 
I 
AWGClm = 2 {WGE/m + (100 - WGClr)} 
where f and m refer to female and male respecti vely. Likewise, the average gender share of 
workload can be defined as: 
I 
AGSWr = 2{GSWr + ( IOO - GSWm)} 
I 
AGSWm = 2 {GSW m + ( 100 - GSWr)} 
Obviously, AWGClr+ AWGC/m=AGSWr+AGSWm= 100 holds for each household. The 
deviation of these indicators from parity (Le. 50) can be used to test the statistical 
significance of the gender gap in decision-making for control and workload. 
To test the impact of the machine she 11 er on women's control, we used multivariate 
regression analysis. Because we have cross-section and observational data, and access to 
the machine shell er was not randomised, the results are open to sample selection bias. 
To reduce this bias, we used matching techniques. The key covariate is the area planted 
to groundnut, which is significantly greater in the shell er group (p < 0.000). 
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Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we matched households according to their 
propensity score, predicted from observed covariates by logistic or probit regression, to 
create a counterfactual group. Tn view of the small sample size, our first choice of matching 
algorithm was nearest one-neighbour matching. Further details on methodology and 
testing of results may be found elsewhere (Orr et aI. , 2014). Finally, the following 
regression model was estimated by including the households from the shell er group and 
the matched households from the non-sheller groups: 
Yi = /30 + /3, xi + /3,Si +"i (iEmatched pairs) 
where y is women 's WGC] for groundnut, x is a vector of covariates [groundnut area size, 
same religion (dummy), husband with an official position in the seed producer group 
(dummy), main wife with an official position in the seed producer group (dummy), 
polygamy (dummy), gender sum of age, gender gap in age, gender sum of groundnut 
farming years, gender gap in groundnut farming years, household headcount, household 
adult women ratio, the ratio of area planted to modem varieties for all crops], S is the group 
dummy (I for the sheller group, 0 otherwise), e is the random error teml and i refers to the 
household. Groundnut production, sales and area planted are multicollinear and therefore 
cannot be included in the regression at the same time. Among the three, we opted for area 
planted because we judged this to be more reliable than self-reported figures for production 
and sales. Lastly, /3, is designed to capture the average treatment effect on the treated to be 
estimated. 
4 'WOMEN'S CROPS' AND THE POWER TO NAME 
In this section, we compare women's perceived levels of control over groundnuts 
compared with other crops and compare differences in perceptions between women and 
men. We dissect the arguments used for and against groundnuts as a women's crop and 
show how the power to name reflected traditional views of gender roles and the conjugal 
contract. 
We tested the hypothesis that groundnuts were a women's crop by comparing women's 
perceived control key decisions for groundnuts with cotton, maize and sunflower. The 
results show that the difference between cotton and groundnut was statistically highly 
significant for all eight decisions (p-value for the paired t-test < O.OOI ), supporting the 
concJusion that groundnuts were a women's crop. 
Figure 3 compares the weighted scores for women's perceptions of control for the four 
crops. The left-hand panel presents the results from the FODs, while the right-hand panel 
shows the results from the household survey. The women felt that they controlled all the 
major decisions about groundnuts from land preparation to the use of income but perceived 
that they had less control over cotton. Maize occupied the middle ground, with control 
shared fairly evenly between women and men. In terms of method, the women in FGDs 
perceived greater differences in control than the women interviewed in the household 
survey. The women saw groundnuts as firml y under their control. ' We make a bowl of 
peanut butter for the men and the children. The rest is for us. It's our money' (Kapenya). 
'Men neglect groundnuts, but when it's time for marketing they start interfering.' 
(Kazingizi). 'Men come with a bleeding heart, not forcibly, but know that if they come 
humbly their wife will increase the amount of money from groundnuts she will give them' 
(Kazingizi). 
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Figure 3. Women's percepti on ~ of control over groundnut~. cotton, maize and sunflower in Eastern 
Pro vince. Zambia (weigbted scores) 
We tested the hypothesis that men and women disagreed over the level of women's 
control for groundnuts. The results confi rmed that men and women di ffered sharply in the ir 
views on how much control women enjoyed over groundnuts, and that men saw 
themselves as exerti ng significant control over thi s 'women's crop' , 
Figure 4 compares men's and women's perceptions of women's contro l for groundnuts 
and cotton. For groundnuts, the women perceived themselves as having more contro l (b lue 
line), while the men perceived women as hav ing less contro l (red li ne). For cotton, the 
opposite was true, The women perceived themselves as havi ng very little control. whereas 
the men perceived women as having more contro l. In terms of method, both FODs and the 
household survey gave simiJar results, bUI the women in the PO Ds perceived that they had 
greater controJ over groundnuts and less contro l over cotton than did the women in the 
household survey. The different results between the FGDs and the household survey in 
Figures 3 and 4 may refl ect smaller sample size and the publ ic, confron tational nanl re of 
these discllss ions which may have polarised opinion and encouraged women to take a 
more extreme view of gender ro les regarding these crops. 
We asked the men and women how much contro l they percei ved that women had over 
fo ur crops and compared these perceptions using the paired H est (Table 2). The lest 
compared the di fference between A WGCI,. and IOO - A WGC/m• The difference was 
statistically signUicant in all cases. In other words, the women believed that they bad more 
control over decision-making for all four crops lhan the men thought they had. 
The women based their ' right ' to contro l groundnuts on two arguments. Firstly, the 
women asse rted the ir moral right 10 control groundnuts because they provided most of 
the labo ur. '!lmen want a/ew peanuls 10 ear, Ihey will help, bUI thaI's all, they don 'tfeel 
it's their job to weed grollndnll1s' (Kazingizi). 'Few men pay attention 10 the groundmtls 
field. When you work Ihere, thar's when your husband takes a bath and goes to drillk beer' 
Copyright © 20 16 John Wiley & Sons. Lld. J. I ll!. Del'. (2016) 
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Figure 4. Contrasting perceptions of women's conlTol for groundnms and cotton , by sex, Eastern 
Province, Zambia (weighted scores) 
Table 2. Pa ired Hest on percei ved difference in women's control 
Women ' s control 
Women 's perception Men' s percept ion M ean 
N (A WGClr) (AWGCI",) difference I-stati stic p-vaJue 
Maize 287 42.9 35.6 7.3 8.5 0.000 
Groundnut 286 47,7 39,1 8,6 9,3 0,000 
CottOll 206 39.4 34, 1 5.3 6,2 0,000 
Sunflo wer 183 45,0 43, 1 1.9 2,9 0,004 
Sourcc; Household Survey, 20 14. 
Note: The table compares the IOtal leve l of control that men and women bel ieve that women have over fo ur crops . 
Highe r values represent greater control. 
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(Kapenya). 'Men won't even bother to step there' (Kapenya). 'My husband would rather 
weed cotton than groundnuts' (Kapenya). 
To test if a higher workload gave the women greater control , we compared the 
correlation between the women's perceptions of their share of the workload (GSWr) for 
maize and groundnuts with their perception of their degree of control over these crops, 
as measured by their total control (WGCIr) and their control over the use of 
income. Workload was positively correlated with total control and control over use of 
income (Table 3). For the women, the correlation between their share of the workload 
and their control was statistically significant for both maize and groundnuts, suggesting 
that the women's workload did confer some degree of control. For the men, the correlation 
between workload and control was statistically significant for maize but not for groundnuts 
in either type of control. In the women's minds, therefore, their control over decision-
making for groundnuts was associated with a greater share of the workload. 
The women also based their 'right' to control groundnuts on the grounds of reciprocity 
because income from cotton was controlled by the men. 'No matter what you say, cotton is 
tip to the men' (Kapenya). ' You can 'f even say anything ahout hired lahour for cotton, if'S 
a man '05 crop. That's the way marriages end' (Kazingizi). 'As for control of coUon sales, 
we can't even tlY' (Kapenya). 'They don 't even tell you they've sold cotton. You count 10 
hales then YOlt see that two hales have gone, but they don't even mention anything about 
the money' (Kizingizi). 'Cotton gives ownership of money to go and drink beer alld even 
marry another wife' (Kapenya). The women's role was simply to provide labour. 'You can 
work a few days on the groundnuts but the rest of the time you need to weed cotton. You 
can 't even say anything' (Kazingizi). 
We tested the hypothesis of reciprocity by comparing the correlation between the 
women's perception of their control over groundnuts and the men's control over maize 
and cotton (Table 4). The relationship is negative and statistically significant, implying that 
the higher the women's control over groundnuts, the higher their control over maize and 
cotton. The same applies to the men's perceptions. This suggests that there is no 
reciprocity between the women's control over groundnuts and the men's control over 
cotton. In short, the women with the most control over groundnuts had more control over 
cotton and not less. 
One argument that the women did not use for their control of groundnuts was an appeal 
to tradition. In women-only FGDs, the women identified four attributes of 'women's 
Table 3. Correlation between shares of workload and control in farming of maize and groundnuts 
Gender Control Maize Groundnuts 
Women Total control 0.462 I 0.278 
{J = 0.000 P = 0.000 
Control over use of income 0.222 0.269 
p=O.OOI p=O.OOO 
Men Total contro l 0." I 0.032 
p=O.061 P = 0.596 
Control over use of income 0.157 0.095 
p=0.012 p = 0.116 
Note: The table compares the correlation between women' s perceived share of their workload for maize and 
groundnuts and their perceived share of total control over these crops, as perceived by women and men. A 
significant and positi ve correlation coefficient indicates that a higher work load is associated wi th higher control. 
1 Pearson's coefficient of correlation. 
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Table 4. Correlation between women' s control over groundnuts wi th men' control over maize and 
cotton 
Women 's control over groundnut versus 
Men's control over maize Men's control over cotton 
Women's perception 
Men' s perception 








Note: A positive correlation indicates that higher control over groundnuts is associated with higher control over 
other crops. Hi gher values represent greater contro l. 
I Pearson' s coeffi cienl of correlation. 
crops': (i) there was no market (i.e. prices were low); (ii) the men contributed little Jabour; 
(iii) they were used as a relish, not the main meal ; and (iv) they needed patience because 
they had to be shelled or picked from a pod. Conspicuously absent from this list is any 
mention of women's crops as a source of cash income. Rather, what distinguished 
women' s crops was their low market value. Obviously, invoking tradition to justify the 
women's control over groundnuts was a dangerous argument because the recent ri se in 
the price of groundnuts was preci sely why the men had suddenly become interested in 
the crop. 
For the men, the key argument against groundnuts as a women's crop was its emerging 
status as a cash crop. 'Groundnuts are not necessarily a women's crop, because itfetches a 
higher price than cotton. Groundnuts are 110t a women's crop. This house was built with 
money from groundnuts' (Men's FGD, Kagunda). 'We never used 10 consider groundnllls 
as a crop for men but now this is changing. It used to be a woman 's crop. Now it 's a crop 
for everyone' (men in plenary, Kagunda). The men therefore challenged the definition of 
groundnuts as a women's crop by invoking their traditional 'right' to control cash income. 
While the men stopped short of claiming groundnuts as a 'men's crop', based on the ' male ' 
attribute of high market prices, they did claim that groundnuts was now gender-neutral , 
like maize. Renaming groundnuts as 'a crop Jar everyone' left open the thorny question 
of the 'power to name' and ultimate control. 
Arguments over the power to name are based on a wider system of beliefs about gender 
roles. Among the matrilineal Chewa, crop agriculture was historically the concern of 
women because men were away for long periods occupied in hunting and trade (Morris, 
1988). Although in our survey area, inheritance was no longer matrilineal, the older culture 
was refl ected in traditional beliefs about gender roles. Women were responsible for the 
daily meal and for the relish crops. Responsibility for maize, the staple food crop, was 
shared between men and women. Men were responsible for providing cash for essential 
items and for buying maize when it ran out.7 in the settler economies of eastern Africa 
where the colonial state limited the export crops that Africans could grow, the main source 
of cash income was wage employment. In Zambia, therefore, the association of cash 
income with men goes back to the colonial period, when the imposition of hut tax forced 
70ur main source for traditional gender roles and responsi bilities in the survey area is the 1977 study of Kefa 
village (S kjonsberg, 1989, pp. 37- 38, 83, 88). Kefa is located 30km from Chipata town, compared with an 
average of 50 km fo r our survey villages. For simi lar traditions in other parls of Zambia, refer to GeisJer (1993) 
for the southern region and Crehan (1983) for the north-west. We use the label 'traditional' in a restrictive sense 
because precolonial views of gender roles may have been vel)' different (von Bulow, 1992). 
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men to supply labour for white-owned farms and mines (Pletcher, 1979). The economic 
imperat ives of colonialism made cash a male domain. 
The women in FGDs echoed these traditional beliefs. 'Groundnuts are a food, so we 
control food for the household' (Kapenya). 'Maize is a critical crop. If a man decides 
not to keep some bags to eat, it's his responsibility to find piece-work to earn cash to 
buy maize' (Kapenya). ' When we need income quickly, we decide 10 use the sheller. The 
man is responsible for bringing in cash income' (men's FGD, Kagunda). 'Men have to 
make sure there's money in the house. That 's why they're interested in groundnuts' 
(Kazingizi). Hence, the conjugal contract acts as a reference point both for women 
defendin g their right to groundnuts and for men staking claims to the cash from groundnut 
sales. 
Commercialisation threatens the conjugal contract because it reverses traditional gender 
roles. The women now find themselves growing a cash crop that rivals cotton. The power 
to name serves to preserve the conjugal contract by rethinking the status of groundnuts as a 
'women 's crop'. Deeply rooted beliefs over gender roles help explain why 'women 's 
crops' aroused such strong emotions in FGDs. The men's moti vation was not simply 
financial- the selfi sh wish to boost income- but cultural. Naming groundnuts as a 
'woman 's crop' reflects a cultural definition of gender in which cash for household needs 
is provided by men. The commercialisation of women's crops challenges this definition by 
putting cash into the hands of women. From a male perspective, women who insisted that 
groundnuts should remain a 'woman 's crop ' were usurping male identity.8 An economistic 
view that sees gender conflicts in purely material terms misses this cultural dimension. 
5 COMMERCIALISATION AND CONTROL 
In this section, we test the hypothesis that commercialisation has reduced women's control 
over groundnuts and assess how women view men's participation in groundnuts. The 
results suggest the need to rethink the view of commercialisation and gender as a zero 
sum game. 
We tested the hypothesis that the introduction of the machine sheller for groundnuts, 
which is operated primarily by men, would reduce women's perceived level of control 
over groundnuts. The results showed that the women percei ved that the shell er had actually 
increased their control over groundnuts, leading us to reject the hypothesis that 
mechanisation had reduced women's control. 
Table 5 shows the results of the matched regression using the selected matching 
algorithm. The women's WGClr is positively related to a membership of a sheller group, 
and the coefficient is statistically significant at the five per cent level. Other covariates also 
significantly affect women's control. Women in polygamous households had greater 
control over groundnuts, which is consistent with previous research showing that Zambian 
women in a polygamous marriage enjoy greater autonomy (Crehan, 1983). Adoption of 
improved groundnut seed also had a negative effect on women' control, perhaps because 
in such households, men were more actively involved in making farming decisions. 
~his sometimes worked to women's advantage. Women in Malawi resi sted attempts by the colonial state to make 
them sell groundnuts for eash in orderto pay hut tax beeause this was a male responsibi lity. They continued to sell 
groundnuts to Indian traders. but for cloth (Bezner-Kerr, 20 10). 
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Table 5. Result of matching regression 
Depe ndent variable: Women's Gender Control Index (WGCIr) for groundnuts 
Treatment variable: she ller group (yes = 1) 
Matched 
regression Variable Coefficient (-statisti c p-value 
F( l l,158)=2.58 Sheller group (yes = 1) 6.56 1. 17 0.002 
p-valuc = 0.003 Area pl anted 10 groundnuts 1.82 1.37 0. 172 
R2 =O. 175 Spouses of same religion (yes = I ) 0.88 0.4 1 0.68 1 
Hu sband has official position in EPFC group -2.00 -0.53 0.594 
(yes= I) 
Wife has official posi tion in EPFC group 1.80 0.48 0.632 
(yes = I ) 
Polygamy (yes = I) 10.71 2.3 1 0.022 
Sum of age 0.11 2.00 0.047 
Gap in age (age of husband - age of wife) - 0.37 - 1.79 0.076 
Sum of experience with groundnuts -0.11 -1.42 0. 157 
Gap in experience with groundnu ts (experience 0.09 0.28 0.782 
of husband - experience of wife) 
Household size - 0.37 - 0.74 0.462 
Household adult female ratio - 3 1.60 - 1.7 1 0.089 
Area planted 10 improved seed, all crops (%) -8.57 -2.16 0.033 
Constant 59.69 5.68 0.000 
Although the area planted to groundnuts was a key determinant of receipt of treatment 
(i.e. provision of machine shellers), its effect on women's control is not statistically 
signi ficant. Moreover, replacing the area planted to groundnuts with the volume of 
groundnuts sold also gave an insignificant coeffici ent (p=O.307). Because neither the area 
planted to groundnuts nor the amount of groundnuts sold was negati ve or statistically 
significant, this suggests that the commercialisation of groundnuts did not reduce women's 
control. 
A closer examination showed differences in the type of control exercised by the women 
in EPFC groups with and without the machine shell er. The women with access to a 
machine sheller percei ved that they had greater control over land preparation 
(p=O.0976), weeding (p=O.0167), harvest ing (p=0.0016) and the use of income 
(p=O.0296) from groundnuts (Orr et at., 2014). Thus, post-harvest mechanisation 
increased the women's operational and financial control , but the men retained strategic 
control over the area planted to groundnuts. 
Why did the women not associate male participation in shelling with a loss of control? 
Machine shelling significantly reduced women's workJoadY ' Women will shell one bag a 
day then stop and do household chores, but men can spend the whole day shelling 20 bags. 
When it was shelled by hand, men had no cofltrol' (Kagunda). However, the women had 
no objection to sharing control for shelling. 'Women decide to use the groundnut sheller 
because they know that men. will not help shell by hand. While women cook, men. can be 
"The machine shel1er used by EPFC seed producer groups is operated by lhree people and can shell fou r 50 kg 
bags in I h or lhiny-two 50 kg bags in a working day of 8 h, averaging 533 kg per person. In one eight-hour 
day, a woman can shell 25 kg by hand. Thus, a machine sheller can do the work of 20 women in one day. Farm 
Management data from Eastern Province in {he 1970s show that it required 2426 h ha -I to cultivate groundnuls, 
of which 950 h (39 per cent) was spenl on shell ing (S kjonsberg. 1989, p. 46 note 9). 
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busy doing the shelling' (Kagunda). Furthennore, the men now searched for improved 
seed, checked if groundnuts were ready for harvesting and provided a bicycle or ox-cart 
to take groundnuts to market. 
The women were therefore engaged in a difficult balancing act: keeping their 'right ' to 
control over groundnuts while reducing their own workload by using men' s labour for 
shelling, which in turn exposed them to male 'claims' for greater control. But the women 
were in no doubt that they had the best of the bargain. 'Men now do shelling. They never 
used to do that. Men never llsed to help LIS but now they knuw there's money, they have 
joined liS, so we are very happy' (Kazingizi). Thus, the women saw reduced control over 
shelling less as losing control over groundnuts but more as liberating them from drudgery 
and as an opportunity to increase income for the household as a whole. 
The women recognised that without greater male involvement, their households would 
not reap the full benefits of commercialisation. 'We thank men for coming in to help 
growing groundnuts, we can go higher and higher' (plenary, Kazingizi). They did not 
challenge men's strategic control over land but argued that giving women more land to 
plant groundnuts would benefit the whole household. 'We don't come wilh land but if 
we have control of land other decisions will be easier to make' (Kazingizi). ' You cannot 
talk of cash income from groundnuts if you don't have control over land' (Kazingizi). 
Higher prices for groundnuts had made men more receptive to these arguments. 
'Groundnuts are now the main cash crop. Husbands have to decide with their wives 
how to use the income from groundnuts. The decision has 10 be made jointly. Men deciding 
alone would mean the end of the marriage' (men's FGD, Kagunda). The women 
rationa1ised this willingness to share control by an ideology of altruism, seeing it as the 
price they must pay to bring greater benefits for the family. Nevertheless, the idiom they 
used was still one of men 'helping' women rather than being treated as equal partners. 
Why did the women perceive commercialisation as increasing their control over 
groundnuts while then being willing to reduce their control by sharing it with men? We 
believe that this paradox can be explained by the way the research question was framed. 
The tool we developed (Figure 2) was based on the assumption that commercialisation 
was a zero sum game. It saw control as a finite category and asked women how much 
control they had compared with men. On the other hand, it did not ask how much control 
women would be willing to share with men in exchange for higher income from 
groundnuts. This research question requires a different frame of reference based on 
cooperation rather than conflict and focusing on mutual advantage rather than autonomous 
control. The narrowness of our original research question became apparent only when we 
started listening to what women were saying. Our preconcei ved framework left no room 
for cooperation to achieve a common goal, which emerged spontaneously during the 
plenary sessions of the FGDs. 
The expressed willingness of women to share control as a means to increase aggregate 
household income suggests that we are missing something important, namely that 
households are characterised by 'the co-existence of extensive conflicts and pervasive 
cooperation' (Sen, 1990, emphasis added). A 'cooperative-conflict' model of the 
household that envisages commercialisation as more than a zero sum game may be a more 
appropriate framework for understanding how the commercialisation of women's crops 
affects women. True, women in The Gambia and Cameroon lost control over irrigated rice, 
but they used their bargaining power to extract wages for work on family-owned fields, 
which left them better off than before (von Braun & Webb, 1989; Jones, 1986). Similarly, 
an analysis of the introduction of new technology for rain-fed agriculture in the Sahel 
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showed that, compared with other models, the 'cooperation-conflict ' model of the 
household gave the highest increase in total household income, and that women were 
financially better-off being paid to work on communal fields, which were more productive, 
than on their own less productive plots (Sanders et aI., 1996). In other words, women 
gained by trading control for higher income. 
Women' s bargaining power rests primarily on their labour power. 'If a man just keeps 
and spends his money, women will nol cultivate his [cottOH] field next season.' 
(Bwanunkha). 'If my wife doesn ' f agree, we cannot grow cotton' (Kagunda). In Uganda, 
bargaining proved an effective way for women to retain control as their crops were 
commercialised (Sorenson, 1996). On the other hand, women's bargaining power is 
weakened by the consequences of divorce if they insist on retaining full control (Dolan, 
2001; Lim et aI., 2007). Disputes over the meaning of 'women's crops' may therefore 
be determined by mutual interest rather than by outright victory for one side. As happened 
with women's vegetable gardens in The Gambia, what starts as a war of words over ' the 
power to name' can end in a compromise that leaves women with a significant degree of 
control (Schroeder, 1996). 
This suggests the need for new research questions. How much autonomy are women 
groundnut growers in Zambia women wiIling to trade in order to increase overall 
household income? Do women really have a choice? How much control would satisfy 
men if overall income increased? What bargain would satisfy both parties? Why does 
bargaining apparently work in some contexts but not in others? Future research using 
behavioural economics offers new and exciting possibilities to answer these questions 
and help evaluate the benefi ts as well as the costs of commercialisation for women. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Our results confirmed that in Zambia 's Eastern Province, groundnuts were a women's 
crop. Women saw themselves as having significantly greater control over groundnuts than 
over cotton, which they perceived as a man 's crop. However, men and women differed in 
their views on women's degree of control. Women saw men as having a lower level of 
control over groundnuts, while men saw their level of control as higher than that perceived 
by women. Similarly, women saw men as having a higher level of control over cotton, 
while men saw the level of women's control as higher than that perceived by women. 
Despite these differences, the results are clear evidence that men and women recognised 
a gender division of control for groundnuts and cotton. 
The commercialisation of groundnuts has sparked debate over its status as a women's 
crop. The women based their claim to name groundnuts as a women's crop on their greater 
share of the workload and men 's monopoly over income from cotton. The men contested 
this by invoking a traditional view of gender roles where men provide cash income while 
women provide the daily meal. Cash income from women's crops was seen as subverting 
this moral order which formed the basis of the conjugal contract. Decisions about the 
allocation of resources and about how the benefi ts of commercialisation were shared were 
therefore played out as disputes over meaning and the power to name. 
Contrary to expectation, we found that women did not perceive that mechanised 
shelling, increasing the area planted to groundnuts, or higher groundnut sales reduced their 
level of control over groundnuts. Indeed, women belonging to groups with a machine 
sheller reported higher levels of control over key decisions, including control over the 
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use of income. The women in FGDs welcomed men' s participation in machine she lling, 
which reduced their drudgery in hand shelling. The women also seemed willing to 
surrender some degree of control over groundnuts in exchange for greater help from men. 
The dominant narrati ve sees commercialisation as a zero sum game in which men and 
women struggle for autonomous control. This is only part of the story. Women groundnut 
growers in Zambia also saw commercialisation as an opportunity for greater cooperation 
that could benefit the household as a whole. This suggests that a 'cooperative-conflict' 
model of the household may hold greater explanatory power for understanding how 
commercialisation might affect women than a conflict mode l based solely on capturing 
changes in autonomy and control. The scope for conflict and cooperation depends on the 
specific historical context and variations in women 's bargaining power. Which will prevail 
is an empirical question. In the present case, commercialisation looks certain to change the 
status of groundnuts as a women's crop, reducing women's operational and financial 
control , but women may consider this a price worth paying if they can negotiate shared 
control over a bigger cash income. 
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